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Why do bank credit policies fluctuate? Why are changes in credit policy seemingly correlated with changes in the condition of those demanding credit? In a rational profit-maximizing world, banks should maintain a credit policy of lending if and only if borrowers have positive net present value (NPV) projects.
Therefore, a change in the level of bank credit should be a consequence only of a change in the credit quality of borrowers --the demand side. In the absence of central bank induced changes in the money supply, bank credit policy --the supply side --should not exert an independent influence on the level of credit.
That the supply side does not affect the level of credit seems at variance with reports in the financial press and the opinions held by bankers. Also, economists have expressed a spectrum of opposing 1 2 viewpoints. The most moderate argue that bank credit policy changes are correlated with changes in fundamental business conditions. This view has a hoary tradition. John Stewart Mills writes in The Principles of Political Economy [p. 650]:
Fluctuations in the rate of interest arise from variations either in the demand for loans or in the supply. The supply is liable to variation though less so than the demand. The willingness to lend is greater than usual at the commencement of a period of speculation, and much less than usual during the revulsion which follows....During the revulsion,...interest rates always rise inordinately, because, while there is a most pressing need on the part of many persons to borrow, there is a general disinclination to lend. This disinclination, when at its extreme point, is called a panic...".
More extreme is Wojnilower [1980] who suggests that the growth of credit is essentially supply determined, interrupted only by regulatory rigidities, problems in major financial institutions or markets, or changes in the expectations of financial market participants. Still others take the polar view that in addition to not being neutral to changes in the condition of borrowers, bank credit policy may actually cause the changes. In his monumental study of crises under the National Banking System, Sprague [1910, p. 209] describes the panic of 1893 thus:
Contraction in loans was perhaps the most striking feature of this crisis. From their maximum amount of $2,161,000,000 on May 4, loans of national banks were reduced...on October 4 to $1,843,000,000, or more than 14.7%....It cannot be questioned, however, that the banks in many parts of the country caused needless damage to their customers by a ruthless policy of loan contraction....Nowhere is this more clearly evident than in Chicago... Each bank pursuing its own selfish policy, all were forced to contract loans, thus increasing the strain upon their own customers...
At the very least, these descriptions suggest that banks exacerbate demand expansions by funding negative NPV projects and accentuate contractions by not funding positive NPV projects. Unfortunately, it
is not easy to empirically validate these observations because it is extremely hard to separate demand side effects from supply side effects. Also, with the exception of Bernanke and Gertler [1987] , economists thus far have had no rational explanation for why changes in credit policy and changes in demand side conditions should be correlated.
In this paper, I present a simple model which offers a theoretical framework consistent with the informal observations above. Bank management, in my model, is rational but has short term concerns. In addition to maximizing the bank's earnings, it is concerned about the stock or labor market's perception of its abilities, i.e., its reputation. I assume the composition of bank loan portfolios as well as the specific performance of borrowers is not immediately and easily observable by the market. Instead, the market can only observe the bank's earnings. Consequently, bank management may attempt to shape the market's 3 perceptions by manipulating current earnings.
This is most easily done if the bank alters its credit policy. For example, a bank may attempt to 4 convince the market of its credit evaluation abilities by concealing the extent of bad loans originated. It can do this by maintaining a liberal credit policy --extending the term of loans, lending new money so that insolvent borrowers can keep up the pretence of being current on their loans, and weakening covenants so as to avoid recognizing default. Isomorphically, the bank may attempt to convince the market of the profitability of its lending. Again it can achieve this with a liberal credit policy that generates upfront fees at the expense of future credit quality. In general, a liberal credit policy boosts current earnings at the 5 expense of future earnings. The bank is trapped into this Second Best credit policy simply because the market expects it.
The market is more forgiving of a bank's poor performance if it knows that the entire borrowing sector has been hit by a systematic (and unpredictable) adverse shock. When multiple banks lend to a sector, the market learns something about the systematic component of uncertainty from each bank's earnings. This informational externality makes bank credit policies interdependent. A bank's reputation is less sensitive to 6 poor earnings when other banks admit to poor earnings. Because true earnings are less likely to be high when the borrowing sector is distressed, banks coordinate on an adverse shock to borrowers to tighten credit policy.
This can explain the correlation between changes in credit policy and changes in demand side conditions discussed above.
The extension to a dynamic setting, where the condition of the borrowing sector is endogenously determined by bank credit policies, is straightforward. A theory of low frequency business cycles, driven by suppliers of credit, emerges from this simple framework. When there is only a small probability of an adverse shock to the borrowing sector, banks are forced to maintain excessively liberal credit policies. This in turn leads to overinvestment by the borrowing sector which increases the likelihood of an adverse shock to it. It is only after the condition of the borrowing sector deteriorates considerably that banks have an incentive to tighten the supply of credit. When they retrench, investment is suddenly curtailed, the excesses are drained out of the borrowing sector, and the cycle resumes.
I study the experience of New England banks with real estate loans in the early 1990s and obtain evidence in support of some of the assumptions and implications of the model. I find evidence that suggests bank loan loss/earnings announcements conveyed information to the market about the condition of the real estate sector. Also, New England banks seemingly underreported real estate loan losses during much of 1988
and 1989, as is evidenced by the smoothness in reserving despite the dramatic deterioration in the real estate sector. Finally, bank quarterly loan loss provisions/charge-offs in New England between 1986 and 1992 were significantly related to the quarterly provisions/charge-offs made by other New England banks, even after correcting for changes in publicly observable fundamentals.
The rest of the paper is as follows. In Section I, the basic model is laid out and it is solved in Section II. Section III examines the evidence and Section IV concludes with policy implications. The related literature is discussed during the course of the exposition.
I. The Model

A. The Structure
Consider an economy with banks, many potential borrowers and a public market. At date 0, each 7 bank evaluates its lending opportunities and then makes a single loan. After the loan is made, the state of the borrowing sector is realized at date 1. It can be normal (N) or adverse (A). In practice, a bank's competence in evaluating credit and monitoring loans determine whether its lending is profitable. I term these competencies the bank's ability. Specifically, a bank's state-contingent ability, 2 , is the probability with 8 s which a loan made by that bank is good (to be defined shortly) when the state is s , S = {N,A}. Then 1-2 s is the probability that the loan turns out bad.
There are two types of banks; high type banks, indexed by 'H', and low type banks indexed by 'L'.
Furthermore, I assume the adverse state makes it very hard for any banker to make a good loan, i.e., the adverse state collapses the distribution of abilities. A natural and economical parameterization of the statecontingent abilities of different types is 2 = 1 > 2 = 2 and 2 =0=2 . The assumption that leads to
this parameterization is stronger than necessary and I discuss alternative assumptions and parameters later.
After observing the realization of the loan at date 1, the bank has to decide whether to terminate or continue the loan. The termination of a bad loan will lead to costly bankruptcy and possibly, the liquidation of the borrower's assets at a fire-sale. For simplicity, I assume the bank's date-1 earnings are reduced by $1
if it terminates and charges off a bad loan at date 1 and that date-1 earnings increase by a negligible amount 9 if the loan is good.
Instead of disclosing poor earnings, the bank can attempt to hide the bad loan from the market till date 2 by setting a liberal credit policy; rescheduling payments, weakening covenants to prevent default and lending 'new' money to help the borrower make payments. If the bank sets such a policy, the bad loan does not affect earnings with probability a. But regardless of whether the bad loan impacts earnings or not, the liberal policy reduces the bank's future expected earnings by c. Alternatively, the bank can set a tight policy, terminating bad loans whenever they occur. The tight policy has no effect on future earnings.
A liberal credit policy reduces expected earnings because the returns from eventual liquidation may decrease as arrears accumulate, new money is wasted and the borrower's assets lose value in financial distress. Further, concealment activities could divert management's attention from more productive investment opportunities. Finally, softness towards one delinquent borrower reduces the bank's bargaining power in future negotiations. In this risk neutral world where the discount rate is zero, I capture the idea that a liberal credit policy is a negative NPV extension of credit with the assumption (A.1) 10 c > a .
B. Information structure.
It is immaterial to the results whether a bank knows its own ability. But I assume the market and other banks do not know the bank's ability. Their common date-0 prior that the bank's ability is high, also 
credit policy.
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In summary, the timing is as follows: For instance, the threat of takeovers where both explicit and implicit contracts are breached (see Shleifer and Summers [1988] ) could lead to a collapse of managerial horizons. I now examine bank behavior in this simple setting.
II. Equilibrium Bank Behavior
It is instructive to examine the simplest cases first. Let ( = 0 so that the manager does not have short term concerns. In that case, from the manager's maximization problem and assumption A.1, a = 0, which S is also the First Best credit policy. All the results in this paper are therefore a product of management's short term concerns. Now let ( > 0.
A. Equilibrium with only one bank
Consider, at first, an economy with only one bank. Let the market's prior of the adverse state It is easily shown that for a given market prior B,
Proposition 1a
There exist costs cN and cNN where a < cN < cNN such that it is an equilibrium for the bank to set a liberal credit policy if and only if c # cN and to set a tight credit policy if and only if c $ cNN. No equilibrium exists if cN < c < cNN.
Proof of Proposition 1a. See appendix.
Note that there is at most an unique equilibrium. Furthermore, the bank's credit policy is the same in both states. It is clear that for c < cN, reputational concerns distort managerial credit policy away from the optimal tight policy. The higher the (, the greater the bank's incentive to set a liberal policy and the higher are cN and cNN. The incentive to set a liberal credit policy exists even though the market fully anticipates it and the expected change in the bank's reputation is zero. This replicates the result in Holmstrom [1983] , Narayan [1985] , and Stein [1989] . 
.
I assumed in section I.A. that ability differences between the 'high' type bank and the 'low' type bank are relatively higher in the normal state than in the adverse state. This assumption, similar to the single crossing conditions in signalling models, is responsible for lemma 1. When the market's prior of the adverse 
B. Equilibrium with two banks.
Consider now two banks who lend to the same sector. The first bank (indexed by 1) observes the state and its own loan outcome. It then decides its credit policy after which its earnings are publicly revealed.
For notational simplicity, I set ( = 1/2 so that it drops out of the incentive compatibility conditions. For expositional reasons, I first assume the second bank (indexed by 2) hears the first bank's earnings announcement before deciding credit policy. As I discuss later, the results continue to hold when banks announce earnings simultaneously. I start my analysis by considering the second bank's problem. 
The market uses the posterior B and the second bank's earnings to update the latter's reputation. (3) and (4), where a is the second bank's credit policy on seeing the first bank 2+ 1+ 2-(+) s declare negative (positive) earnings. In the appendix, I show that in any equilibrium, B > B .
1-1+
The first bank sets its credit policy keeping in mind that the market will evaluate it after updating B with information from the second bank's (yet uncertain) earnings. It does, however, know that the probability the second bank's earnings are positive depends on the state. Consequently, the expected sensitivity of the first bank's reputation to earnings is state dependent and its credit policy becomes state dependent. The first bank's incentive compatibility conditions are straightforward and derived in the appendix. An equilibrium is a set of incentive compatible credit policies ((a ,a ), (a , a )) such that the 
C. The Effects of Demand Side Conditions on Credit Policy.
When a single bank lends, credit policy does not depend on the state of the borrowing sector (the demand side). But when two banks lend to the same sector, the first bank's equilibrium credit policy can be state contingent. Because the first bank's earnings influence the second bank's credit policy, the latter's expected credit policy will also be different across states, even though it may not directly be state contingent. The point of Proposition 2 is that banks tighten credit policy when the state of the borrowing sector deteriorates, even though the deterioration is not observable to the public. The change in state -the demand shock -provides a signal on which banks credibly coordinate in tightening credit policy. Thus demand shocks have supply side effects. From a outside observer's perspective though, the supply side effect may seem to pre-date, or even cause, the demand side effect.
This proposition has important practical implications. There is a debate --for example, see Bernanke and Lown [1991] --whenever banks as a group tighten credit as to whether the contraction is driven by a deterioration in the quality of borrowers (demand side) or whether it is a whimsical change in bank credit policy (supply side). Proposition 2 suggests that a contraction in credit policy will accompany an adverse shock to borrowers, compounding the effect of the shock. When the shock dissipates, banks liberalize their credit standards. Bank credit policies thus accentuate demand side fluctuations and it will be hard to empirically distinguish the two. The popular press may be right when it argues that banks become overly conservative in bad times, but this is only relative to the excessively liberal policies that prevailed earlier.
Economists may be right when they say that the contraction in credit is related to the condition of borrowers (the demand side), but there is also an independent change in bank credit policy, for the reasons we have discussed.
A corollary to proposition 2 is that an adverse shock to one borrowing sector will affect bank credit policy in another. When the market knows the bank has made loans to a sector hit by a shock (it knows about the shock from the earnings performance of other specialized banks), the sensitivity of the bank's reputation to its earnings will be reduced. But by assumption, the quality and composition of the bank's assets are not observed by the market. If the bank lends to multiple sectors, the market cannot trace back poor earnings performance to any specific sectoral loan. The bank then faces the same incentives when determining credit policy towards a loan, independent of the sector the loan has been made to. Thus a demand shock in one sector will cause banks to contract credit to all sectors. policy equilibrium is ((a,a), (0,0)). If regulators want to intervene selectively, they would naturally focus on bank 1, which has a very liberal credit policy. Assume they warn the bank that future examinations will be more frequent and more exhaustive. This threat raises c , say to 0.7, and forces bank 1 to tighten its credit a more expansionary policy of (a,0). The intuition is revealing. Before intervention, the market still has some residual uncertainty about the state after observing positive earnings from the first bank--it is possible that positive earnings could be a result of the liberal credit policy followed by the bank in the adverse state. But after intervention, the market knows the first bank is forced to maintain a tight credit policy. If it nevertheless declares positive earnings, it must imply that the state is normal for sure. This then removes the protection of residual uncertainty from the second bank, making its reputation much more sensitive to earnings. Thus the second bank liberalizes credit policy in response to the intervention.
Selective intervention can also cause the unregulated bank to tighten credit policy, if, for instance, the market's posterior of the adverse state is higher after intervention. Again the intuition is that even though the market fully anticipates the consequences of the intervention, the information with which the market evaluates the unregulated bank changes. These spillovers change the latter's credit policy. If such spillovers are unanticipated by regulators, the change in credit policy may seem perverse or excessive compared to the direct intervention.
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D. Welfare Implications: Herd behavior versus Niche Behavior.
Is the second bank better off lending alone to a different sector (with its own independent shocks) or is it better off lending to the same sector as the first bank? In other words, is it better for the market to have more, or less, information to evaluate the bank? In a rational expectations equilibrium, the market anticipates the bank's actions perfectly. Ex ante the realization of the state and loan outcome, the expected change in the bank's reputation is zero. Consequently, the bank only takes into account the expected excess cost of its future credit policy when it evaluates the above two situations at date 0.
Because the first bank's earnings are informative, B $ B $ B . Denoting the second bank's 1-1+ (constant) credit policy if it lends alone as a , from lemma 1 it is clear that
2-2+ s
It is easily shown that In general, if the common component of uncertainty is filtered out, rewards become more sensitive to the agent's performance. In turn, this will increase the expected amount of influence activities (see Milgrom and Roberts [1988] ) the agent undertakes to affect performance measurement. Since credit policy in my model is essentially an influence activity, it is interesting to understand why it does not always become more liberal when uncertainty is filtered out. The reason is that, unlike previous work, ability differences in my model are dependent on the common component of uncertainty (the state). Even though the bank is largely stripped of excuses in the normal state (which increases influence activities), in the adverse state it is not expected to perform well even if it is the high type (which reduces its influence activities). Whether the additional information about the state from relative performance evaluation increases or reduces influence costs depends on the importance of each effect. This is why welfare could go either way.
Proposition 3 has practical implications for an bank's portfolio choice. Consider a situation where two banks have to decide the fraction of their lending to allocate to a particular sector. Their decision is affected by their anticipation of the costs of distorted credit policies. If the banks have low costs to providing liberal credit (i.e., c is low), the proposition suggests that the portfolio fractions chosen are strategic complements --it costs a bank less to lend to a sector if it knows another bank is also lending to it. Thus there could be ex ante herding in lending to certain sectors even if those sectors are intrinsically less profitable than others. Conversely, if banks have high costs of liberal credit, their portfolio decisions are strategic substitutes --banks want to lend to relatively uncrowded but perhaps less profitable niches.
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E. Simultaneity, Multiple Equilibria and Endogenous Credit Cycles.
While I have examined the case of sequential credit policy decisions first, it is equally straightforward to have banks choose credit policy simultaneously. Propositions 1, 2, and 3 continue to hold, with the obvious change that the second bank's credit policy is now a function of the state rather than the first bank's earnings (proofs are available from the author). Interestingly, both banks are now uncertain about each other's earnings when choosing credit policy. This introduces an element of strategic complementarity in bank credit policies --if one bank believes the other bank will liberalize credit policy, it has an incentive to do so itself. This could result in multiple equilibria. Also, it is interesting to extend the model to multiple periods because the shock to borrowers (the change of state) can be endogenized. Putting the extensions together, I show that bank credit policies can create low frequency business cycles.
To keep the model tractable, I make some simplifying assumptions. First, managers live only for two periods. Second, managers hired at date t run the bank only for one period during which they make one loan, after which they retire -to start a career in politics (or another industry). At date t+1, the next generation of managers take over. As the new management has not had the opportunity to take decisions, it starts with the same reputation p as did old management. Finally, I assume that at date t+2 when the market sees the bank's earnings, it also learns about the credit policies followed by the date-t managers. Date-t managers die at this date, so they cannot be rewarded or punished for their past policies. Thus the effect of liberal date-t credit policies on future earnings, c, is filtered out by the market before it evaluates date-t+1 managers, and has no effect on future managerial decisions.
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The probability of the adverse shock, B , is representative of the condition of the borrowing sector, t i.e., the condition of the real economy. It is natural to think that B is a function of past credit policies; the t greater the number of unprofitable projects that are continued with liberal credit policies (as opposed to being closed down), the lower the economic profits in the sector, the more perverse the actions of the borrowers, and the greater the chances that even ex ante credit worthy borrowers will be driven to ruin. Another interpretation is that the more projects that are financed today in order to generate current fees, the more likely it is that there will be a future glut of production in the market. A representation of the dynamics of In words, the probability of the adverse state increases if at least one of the banks maintains a liberal policy,
and decreases if both banks maintain tight policies.
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The market's prior of the adverse state occurring, B , is the variable which links periods together. To t understand the dynamics, it is instructive to examine how equilibrium credit policies depend on B . I assume t that both banks have the same cost of liberal credit c each period. This combined with the fact that bank managements start with the same initial reputation each period enables me to focus on symmetric equilibria.
Proposition 4.
(i) If (a,a) is an equilibrium for some B = BN, it is an equilibrium for all B < BN. Before tracing out the condition of the borrowing sector over time, I have to specify how I select an equilibrium when multiple equilibria obtain. A plausible selection rule is persistence; that is, if multiple equilibria are possible this period, the one that obtains is the one that prevailed in the last period. By (i), (iii) and (iv) above, this rule is well defined provided B -B is not too large. More important, this rule ensures that the endogenous business cycles are not a result of movements between sunspot equilibria.
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I simulate the condition of the borrowing sector, B , over 80 periods for the data in example 2 (see t Figure I ). It is easy to understand why the path is cyclic. If business conditions are good (B is low), 19 t equilibrium credit policies will be very liberal. Even if an adverse shock hits, credit policy will continue to be liberal. Furthermore, adverse shocks will be infrequent because B is low. But by (9), B will increase the results in this paper. First, bank managers should believe that future rewards (or punishment) depend on their relative performance vis a vis other bank managers in the industry. Second, the reward structure should be such that good performance is more valued when other bank managers are performing well than when they are performing badly. The first 'reduced form' assumption is standard and stems directly from managerial concerns about reputation and the common component of uncertainty.
I obtain the second 'reduced form' assumption in the paper by assuming that the distribution of abilities collapses in the adverse state. This then leads to lemma 1 that the sensitivity of reputation to performance increases as the market's prior of the normal state increases --because the 'high' type is more likely to be able to distinguish itself in the normal state. The assumption about state-contingent abilities in the paper is, however, much stronger than needed (though assuming that the state contingent ability of one kind of bank dominates the ability of the other kind in a first order stochastic sense makes labelling the dominant bank as the 'high' type uncontroversial). All I need is that the management and/or the market should value ability in the normal state much more than ability in the adverse state. In other words, the mapping from the state contingent abilities of different banks to the valuation implicit in the type specifications should be such that 'high' types have greater ability than 'low' types in the normal state, while in the adverse state the difference in abilities can be smaller or even reversed. This mapping is easily rationalized. For instance, managers may care about their reputation because it helps them get higher quality jobs in other banks. If the number of job openings is positively correlated with the banking industry's prospects (the probability of the normal state), then managers want to be known as the type who performs relatively well in the normal state.
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Also there are more direct ways of obtaining the second 'reduced form' assumption than through the mapping of state contingent abilities into types. For instance, let there be a wealthy corporate raider in the economy. Because the raider has a limited capacity to analyze bank stocks, she would like to focus, if possible, on stocks where she knows management is poor. A bank's poor performance when other banks perform well will attract the raider's attention with a consequent loss in managerial perks. Poor performance is less damaging when others perform badly because the raider spreads her attentions and there is only a small probability of being the one targeted for takeover.
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Given these assumptions, the model argues bank credit policies will have an expansionary bias. It suggests that small events touch off large changes in bank lending and that suppliers of credit could generate business cycles. Given the informational spillovers from a bank's performance, the paper argues that regulatory intervention can have unforeseen consequences unless regulators have an appreciation of the true 'model'.
Other models can generate some of these predictions. For instance, Bannerjee [1992] and Welch
[1992] present models of cascades where the initial actions of the first few agents can lead all other agents to ignore their own private information and follow suit. There are some important differences between the cascade model and mine. First, the cascade model assumes that banks are relatively uninformed about the true state of the borrowing sector and rely on other banks for this information. My model, on the other hand, assumes that banks have sufficiently well diversified portfolios in a sector so that they can learn the true state by observing the performance of their loan portfolios, and it is the public markets that are relatively uninformed. I provide evidence suggesting that the public market does learn about the state from bank loan loss announcements. A second difference is that the cascade model predicts far less persistence than does mine. Once banks learn that they have mistakenly overinvested in a sector with the herd, they should cut their losses and exit equally quickly. My model argues that they will be trapped, and will exit only when it is publicly apparent that the sector is a disaster. Third, the cascade model predicts that bank credit will be, in turn, excessively expansionary and excessively contractionary (and this does not necessarily have to vary with demand conditions). My model predicts that it varies from being excessively expansionary in normal times to being just right in adverse ones, so that 'credit crunches' seem contractionary only with respect to prior credit policies but they are not contractionary with respect to true demand conditions. In summary, 23 the cascade model is based on information assumptions which are plausible in explaining herd like behavior in the initial entry into lending to a particular sector, but are less plausible in explaining why banks may paper over losses, declare loan losses together and contract credit policy in bad times.
An alternative explanation of the correlation between demand shocks and the supply of credit is the 'capital constraint' theory proposed by Bernanke and Gertler [1987] . According to their theory, an adverse shock to bank capital constrains bank borrowing from the market and consequently bank lending. Thus credit policy will vary from being just right in normal times to being excessively contractionary after demand shocks. The contractionary bias this model predicts is exactly the opposite of what my model predicts.
While there is no reason to believe the theories are mutually exclusive, the cascade and capital constraint models can be distinguished from the one I present because the theories predict different reactions of credit policy (relative to the optimal) to changes in demand side conditions. For instance, a finding of negative excess returns for new bank real estate loans made when the real estate sector is generally known to be healthy and insignificant excess returns when it has suffered an adverse shock is consistent with my model. In contrast, the capital constraint model predicts positive excess returns to bank lending when the sector has suffered an adverse shock and insignificant returns otherwise. The cascade model does not predict a specific relationship between excess returns and demand side conditions unless, of course, credit policy causes the demand side conditions. In the latter situation, excess returns should be negative when the sector is doing well and positive when it is doing badly. Examining all this is beyond the scope of this paper, though others have made a beginning in this regard (see Mei and Saunders [1992] ). Instead, I study the experience of New England banks with real estate loans in the early 1990s and obtain formal evidence in support of some of the assumptions and implications of the model.
III. Empirical Analysis
A. Evidence of information externalities.
The model assumes that information about the performance of a bank's loan portfolio conveys information about the true state of the economy, and consequently about the likely performance of other bank portfolios. Earlier studies provide peripheral evidence to support this assumption. Aharony and Swary [1983] assess market reactions to signals of the impending failure of U.S. National Bank of San Diego (USNB),
Hamilton National Bank and Franklin National Bank. They find that the failures of USNB and Hamilton, which were primarily as a result of idiosyncratic problems like fraud and internal irregularities, did not have any affect on other banks. However, Franklin's failure which was a result of heavy foreign exchange losses affected other bank stock prices negatively. Aharony and Swary argue that this was because the Franklin failure conveyed information about a common component of uncertainty affecting bank earnings. Similarly, Peavy and Hempel [1988] find that the failure of Penn Square strongly affected the stock prices of banks operating in the same region as Penn Square.
But does failure convey information about common components of uncertainty surrounding the assets of similar banks, or does it convey information about the increased costs of financing from henceforth jittery and unsophisticated depositors? To answer this question, I examine the effects of the following announcement on December 15, 1989 which was reported in the Los Angeles Times (among others) as follows:
Bank of New England Corp., hurting from the region's sagging real estate market, announced today it will sharply boost its reserves to cover bad loans and expects to report a "substantial" loss for the year.... Bank of New England, which said it will boost its loan loss reserves to more than $1 billion, already had made results suggest that the more likely a bank was to make loans in the New England region, the more negative was the announcement effect.
But do these stock price reactions have anything to do with information about real estate? The Bank of New England had real estate loans in 23 states. If, indeed, the announcement conveyed information about the state of the real estate sector, the stock prices of firms connected with real estate should be affected. To check this I collected a sample of publicly traded developers and real estate investment companies. The cumulative abnormal return for the entire sample is a significant -1.5 percent. Moodys contains data on the holdings of these companies, from which I identified 11 firms with at least one property in New England.
The CAR for this subsample is -2.1 percent (T=-1.49) while it is -1.4 percent (T=-2.37) for the remaining firms.
The adverse effect on real estate firms could be the result of an anticipated contraction in the supply of bank credit to such firms (either for the reasons laid out in the model or because of closer regulatory scrutiny of bank real estate loans). But this does not explain the greater adverse effect on real estate firms with property in New England. These firms are well diversified across states (which together with their lower leverage could explain the lower CAR relative to New England banks) and are likely to have access to sources of credit outside New England. It is, perhaps, more plausible to attribute the greater negative effect on firms owning property in New England to information on the state of the real estate sector in New
England conveyed by the announcement.
Finally, I obtain additional evidence in favor of information effects when I examine the determinants of the change in each bank's value on the announcement. The dependent variable in the regressions reported in Table II is the change in the market value of the bank's equity on the announcement, normalized by the bank's assets. Column (i) shows that New England banks lost a significant 0.4 percent more of their assets 27 than banks outside New England. More interesting, the extent of the loss is related to the size of the bank's real estate lending. An increase in real estate lending from the minimum to the mean increases the loss suffered by a significant 0.34 percent of assets. These figures must be judged keeping in mind that the average loss suffered by the banks is only 0.32 percent of assets.
Consider now the specification in column (ii). Note first that it is not that a bank is in New England that accounts for the adverse effects. New England banks without real estate holdings do not suffer any greater loss than do banks outside New
England. But the loss in equity value per unit of real estate holdings is over 3.3 times greater for New
England banks than for other banks. This suggests that the announcement conveyed information about the value of real estate loans in general, and in particular about those made by New England banks. Again, it is possible to argue that the greater loss for banks with New England real estate loans is because the market anticipated regulators would unduly constrain these banks. Presumably, the ability of regulators to interfere would be higher for banks with lower capitalization. But the coefficient on the market equity to assets ratio before the announcement is significantly negative, suggesting that better capitalized banks suffered a greater
loss. An increase in market equity ratio from the minimum to the mean increases the loss by 0.27 percent of assets. It could be argued that regulators focus on book capital rather than market capital. In Column (iii), I include book capital to the specification in column (ii). While the coefficient is positive, it is not statistically different from zero, and does not add to the explanatory power of the regression.
Finally, these regressions offer (weak) evidence that distinguishes my theory from the 'capital constraint' theory proposed by Bernanke and Gertler [1987] . A peripheral implication of their theory is that demand shocks should impact banks with low market capital to a greater extent than banks with high market capital, which is inconsistent with the results in the regression. On the other hand, an explanation consistent with my model is that banks with high market capital are ones who have thus far managed to conceal their troubles and are most affected by the announcement. There are other possible explanations of this phenomenon, the theories are not mutually exclusive, and I cannot draw strong conclusions because I lose so many observations in the regression. The results, however, are intriguing enough to warrant investigation in future research.
B. Evidence on bunching of provisions/charge-offs.
The model predicts that banks will alter credit policies in order to show higher earnings. At the margin, this should be reflected in non-transparent accounting decisions like the provision for bad debts and loan charge-offs. Moyers [1990] and Beatty, Chamberlain, and Magliolo [1992] find evidence that the decision by a bank to provision is discretionary and partially motivated by capital adequacy considerations.
In addition, my model predicts that provisions/charge-offs by other banks in the same lines of business should affect a bank's provisions/charge-offs.
There is a sizeable literature on the bunching of loan loss provisions against LDC debt (for example, see Elliott, Hanna, and Shaw [1991] England banks followed a similar pattern.
Even after correcting for observable fundamental changes in the condition of the borrowing sector, is a bank's provisioning/charge-off decision influenced by the decisions of other banks? The model suggests that provisioning by other banks is a proxy for the non-public information about the state of the borrowing sector. To the extent that I do not include all the market's information about the state of the economy in the specification, I will be overestimating the influence of other banks on a bank's decision. To the extent that I include information that was not public at the time, I will be underestimating the influence. This caveat, and the caveat that we do not know how much of the reserving in 1990-92 is voluntary, must be kept in mind while evaluating the results below.
Following work by Moyers [1990] and Beatty, Chamberlain, and Magliolo [1992] 
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A proxy for the true state of the real estate sector is the bank's real estate holdings (other than bank premises), which represents the real estate the bank has accumulated through foreclosures. In a world 32 without short term behavior, provisions should be influenced by the change in the holdings since the last quarter and expected future changes (normalized by the current value of the bank's assets). Charge-offs should only be influenced by the change in the holdings since the last quarter and not by future changes.
The greater the value of real estate loans as a fraction of total assets, the more likely a bank is to face losses and to have to provision or charge-off. Hence, the ratio of real estate loans to total assets in the previous fiscal year is included as an explanatory variable. The level of loan loss reserves indicates the future charge-offs a bank expects. Furthermore, a bank with adequate reserves is less likely to provision. So I include the loan loss reserves to assets ratio (lagged one quarter). Moyers [1990] argues that banks with low regulatory capital to assets have a tax incentive to add to reserves, so I include the regulatory capital to asset ratio (lagged one quarter). Table III a and the results of a two stage least squares estimation using the pooled data in Table III b.
Consider the first column in Table III b where the dependent variable is the bank's quarterly provisions. This is statistically unrelated to charge-offs but it is related to the change in real estate holdings.
A one standard deviation increase in the change in holdings over the past quarter increases provisions by To summarize, I find that the Bank of New England's announcement about loan losses affected the market's valuation of similar banks and real estate firms. The evidence suggests that these valuation effects stem from information contained in the bank's announcement about the condition of the real estate sector rather than from information about possible regulatory intervention. I also find that bank quarterly loan loss provisions/charge-offs in New England between 1986 and 1992 are significantly related to the quarterly provisions/charge-offs made by other New England banks. This finding is, of course, subject to the caveats that I have mentioned earlier.
IV. Discussion and scope for future research.
Why is this a model of financial intermediaries and not just of any industrial firm? I believe that banks and insurance companies have much more leeway in borrowing from the future to massage current earnings. They can do this simply by reducing the quality of the loans they make or the insurance policies they write, and the recipients have no incentive to complain. By contrast, industrial firms can reduce the quality of their output but will immediately face customer outrage. I, however, do not rule out applying this 34 model to industrial firms. For instance, it offers a rationale for why automobile firms in the U.S. were reluctant to cut dividends in the early Nineties, despite their being in a desperate financial situation, and for why they all cut dividends as soon as General Motors took the plunge.
The model provides an alternative view of agency costs at banks which contrasts with the more common view that the deposit insurance put option causes moral hazard and is the primary reason for regulating bank investment decisions. Unlike the latter, the agency problem I refer to is important even if management is not an owner and even if the bank is well capitalized. While the model provides a rationale for regulation, it also cautions against the excesses of ill-informed regulation. Moreover, regulators could themselves suffer from a similar agency problem (see Boot and Greenbaum [1993] ).
Another problem the paper highlights is that of optimal information disclosure. The model shows that requiring more information to be disclosed is not necessarily welfare improving, because it gives banks the incentive to manipulate real activities in order to present a better picture. It is theoretically possible that a decision to allow banks to fudge their accounting and to maintain secret reserves can improve the quality of their lending decisions. This is yet another example of counter-intuitive comparative statics in a secondbest world, and merits further empirical investigation.
An interesting area for future research is that of the effects that would arise if banks tried to exploit this kind of agency problem against their competitors. For instance, a highly reputable bank might intentionally maintain a facade of normality in adverse times, making it much harder for its less reputable competitors to dump their bad loans. This kind of predatory behavior (or 'destructive competition') could exacerbate the inefficiencies in the model and deserves to be studied. ,a,B) .
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1a. Note that the only action being taken is ex-post the realization of the state.
Therefore, to prove a strategy is an equilibrium, we only have to show that it is incentive compatible. Also, regardless of whether a bank is a high type or a low type, it faces the same incentive compatibility conditions on seeing a bad loan. Therefore, equilibrium policy is not type dependent and we do not really care whether the bank knows its own type or not.
Let
From the incentive compatibility condition ( + -Proof that B < B . From the definitions of B and B , it is easily shown that the inequality holds
For this not to hold, a minimum condition is
So the only equilibrium in which B $ B is one where bank 1's equilibrium actions are a =a and a =0. condition, it will set a = 0 if Noting that B > B and using lemma 1, the right hand side of (A.10) is less than the right hand side of 2-2+ (A.9), so that the two inequalities cannot simultaneously hold. Thus ((0,a),(a , a )) cannot be an equilibrium. 
Substituting (A.15) in (A.11) and (A.12), using (A.13) and (A.14), and knowing that dp /dB < 0 and dp /dB + -> 0, it is easily shown that the incentive compatibility constraints for the first bank cannot be simultaneously satisfied. A similar exercise shows that they are not satisfied when a = 0 and a = a. Thus a =a and a =0 even when the market has the highest prior about the adverse state, B (a,0), the second bank does not want 1- to set a tight policy. Thus ((a,a),(a,a)) is the unique possible equilibrium if c# c = min [c ,c ] .
Similarly, ((0,0),(0,0) ) is the unique possible equilibrium if
. If these hold, a necessary condition for these candidates to be equilibria is that the first bank's incentive compatibility constraint be satisfied. For equilibrium ((a,a) ,(a,a)) to hold, following the same steps, we can derive c such that the first bank's incentive compatibility condition is satisfied only if c#c . Now define Proof of Proposition 2. We have already proved that B < B . By lemma 1, a $ a . Furthermore,
we have shown that (0,a) is never an equilibrium strategy for bank 1. Therefore, a $ a . As discussed in in the range. The proposition holds because the ex ante expected cost to the second bank of a credit policy of (a,0) is strictly better than the ex ante expected cost of a policy (a,a) --which it would maintain if it lent alone. Note that this conclusion is reached independent of the first bank's equilibrium policies. Similarly, it can be shown that the second bank can be made strictly worse off. Knowing that cN < cNN, the rest of the proposition follows. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4:
(i) By the simultaneous move version of proposition 2, a necessary and sufficient condition for (a,a) to be an equilibrium is a,a,B (a,a)) -p (a,a,B (a,a) )] + (1-a) [p (a,a,B (a,a)) -p (a,a,B (a,a) )] $ (c -a)/a
As both B and B increase in B , by lemma 1 the left hand side of (A.27) decreases in B . Hence (i) is true
and (10) is sufficient for an equilibrium to exist.
The necessary and sufficient conditions for (a,0) to be an equilibrium as B 6 0 are (a,0,B (a,0)) -p (a,0,B (a,0) --(A.29) [p (a,0,B (a,0)) -p (a,0,B (a,0) 
It is easily checked that (A.29) does not hold if (10) does.
(ii) Similar to (i). 6. In a recent study, Slovin et al. [1992] provide evidence that banks are special in that individual bank announcements generate external information effects on other banks. They examine the stock price effects of announcements of equity offerings. They find no intra-industry valuation effects for industrial equity issues, suggesting release of only firm specific information. In contrast, for commercial bank equity issues they find significant negative valuation effects of -0.6% on rival commercial banks. It is, however, possible that information about regulatory intent rather than information about a common component of uncertainty affecting bank assets drives this effect.
7.
The market could be the labor market for bank managers, the stock market or even the long term bank bond market.
8. I use the word 'bank' interchangeably with 'bank management', though reputation attaches to management.
9.
In the United States, a loan is charged off when losses are realized. A bank adds to loan loss reserves when it recognizes the potential for losses. The former reduces loan loss reserves while the latter reduces earnings. My theoretical model does not distinguish between the two, and in the empirical section, I examine both.
10.
A liberal or loose credit policy emphasizes current bank earnings at the expense of future earnings.
An isomorphic situation to the one I model is one where credit policy is taken to be the extent to which banks make new loans in order to generate up-front fees. The more liberal the credit policy, the greater the volume of up-front fees, the greater the current earnings and the more likely that loans made are substandard. In either case, a liberal credit policy will adversely impact the bank's future earnings.
11.
All that is needed for the results to hold is that the market does not know the state of the borrowing sector perfectly and gets some information from bank earnings about it. I present evidence for this later. Board puzzles over why it did not work as planned: " When the Board enacted its program, we did not anticipate, and we had no reason to anticipate the impact it would have. Given the limited coverage of the program, it would have been expected to have had a moderate effect...there was a remarkable shift in attitudes that led to a sudden contraction of credit flows. This contraction involved even those sectors that were explicitly exempted from controls...when we removed the controls...we were surprised again by how quickly the economy snapped back" quoted in Schreft [1990, p. 46 ].
14. An interesting corollary to proposition 3 is that a bank will want to commit ex ante to disclosing ahead of (or after) its competitor, even when this has no effect on the competitor's credit policy. This is simply because trading places redistributes incentives between states, enabling the bank to adopt a better (ex ante) credit policy. Of course, the relative timing of earnings disclosures can only increase in importance if it also affects the competitor's credit policy.
15.
For example, the cost of liberal credit policies is directly proportional to the extent of regulatory oversight. The model would suggest that herd behavior should be more prevalent when regulatory oversight is lax, while niche behavior should be apparent when regulatory oversight is tough.
16. These assumptions help me finesse the issue of reputation and signalling effects which are worthy of an entirely new paper. Also, I ignore tipping effects; a liberal credit policy today can increase the bank's cost of maintaining a liberal credit policy in the future, either because it increases the volume of loans that have to be concealed each period or because the bank has less cash to continue making poor loans. Thus the liberal credit policy equilibrium can 'tip' over into the tight credit policy equilibrium automatically. But the simplifying assumptions I make are not implausible. New management has an incentive to reveal old management's mistakes so as not to be held responsible for them in the future.
17.
Implicit in my analysis is that a bank ignores the effect of its own credit policies on the future probability of the adverse state. This is a good approximation if many banks lend to the same sector, as would be true in a more detailed model.
18.
Also, it is consistent with the assumption in previous work on endogenous cycles, as for example in Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny [1989] .
19.
For the updating rule, I assume that
20. Why are cycles so pronounced in insurance markets (see Winter [1991] ) but less so in commercial lending? One potential reason is that regulatory supervision of commercial lending is much tighter. In fact, one of the most important reasons for setting up the Federal Reserve System in the U.S. in 1913 was to deal with the periodic booms and busts caused by bank lending.
21.
Alternatively, the expectation of the occurrence of the normal state in the long run may be much higher than the expectation of the occurrence of the adverse state. If managers become entrenched once they are hired, shareholders have an incentive to hire types who do relatively better in the normal state, because this will maximize long run profits.
22.
The following is yet another justification for the 'reduced form' assumption. Assume banks have capacity constraints (in the short run) on the amount of deposits they can take in. Bank earnings performance informs depositors about the safety of the bank. When other banks are expected to do well, good performance is crucial else uninsured depositors will desert in droves and spread their deposits over other, safer banks, thus precipitating a run. Good performance is less important when other banks are doing badly, simply because the gain in deposits to the capacity constrained bank is small.
23.
The potential ex ante herd behavior demonstrated in my model is different from the ex post herding that characterizes work by Scharfstein and Stein [1990] . In their paper, high ability managers tend to get the same signal about the quality of investments. Managers who are concerned about reputation have an incentive to ignore their private information and mimic the investment decisions made by other managers.
Herd behavior is always inefficient because managers do not use all available information. In my model, by contrast, herd behavior can sometimes improve efficiency (relative to going it alone) because the market can then distinguish poor performance from sectoral shocks, which reduces distortions in credit policy.
24.
See Madura and Zarruk [1992] for a detailed examination of the difference in information effects between loan loss announcements related to LDC loans and loan loss announcements related to real estate.
This sub-section is partly based on a similar dataset to theirs.
25.
Bank of Boston made a large addition to reserves the previous quarter but announced that a substantial part of the addition was to cover potential losses on a single highly leveraged transaction.
26.
I include all the New England based banks that I could find on the CRSP tapes. The regional banks are a random subset of 50 of the regional banks listed on CRSP. The money center banks are those in Elliott, Hanna, and Shaw except for First Interstate Bancorp which I treat as a regional bank.
27.
Bank Compustat has data on only 38 of the 90 banks in my sample. I lose a majority of the regional and New England banks in this regression.
28.
Responding to Citicorp's announcement, a Bank America spokesman stated that its reserves "are appropriate for the asset mix in our overall portfolio. We are aware of no developments that would produce a need for adjustments to this reserve." [Wall Street Journal, May 20, 1987] . But in that very quarter, Bank America added 1.1 billion dollars to its loan loss reserves. There were further rounds of reserving. The 32. The problem with using this measure or the value of non-performing real estate loans (which other authors have used) as a measure of true economic conditions is that it may understate the decline in the real estate sector for the reasons specified in the model; banks will lend (at least for a while) to keep the loans performing. It would, however, be extremely costly for a bank to keep alive a firm close to foreclosure.
Therefore, the level of non-premise real estate may be a better measure of the true state of the real estate sector than the level of non-performing loans.
33.
As a check, I include the ex-post annual failure rate for all businesses in New England (as reported in the Dun and Bradstreet Business Failure Record). The change in explanatory power of the regressions is insignificant, suggesting that I have captured the fundamentals (assuming, of course, that the failure rate is a good proxy for fundamentals even though the model suggests it is partly endogenous).
34.
If this problem is of different magnitudes in industrial and banking firms, we should see differences in how they set management compensation schemes to deal with it. Banking firms should have relatively fewer pay for performance/stock based compensation schemes than industrial firms. Houston and James [1993] provide evidence consistent with this. The daily abnormal return is r -" -$ r where r is the return on the value weighted portfolio, r is the return on the value-weighted Pt P P Mt Pt Mt NYSE/AMEX portfolio, and " and $ are the coefficient estimates from the market model regression estimated between 270 and 20 days before the P P event. The cumulative abnormal returns are the summation of abnormal returns over days -1 to day +1, where day 0 is December 15, 1989. T statistics are computed using the Patell's variance of the forecast error. The dependent variable is the loss in equity value for a bank surrounding the December 15 announcement divided by the bank's total book asset value in previous quarter. The estimated regression is:
Loss in equity = " + $ (explanatory variables ) + ,
Bank i Bank i
The balance sheet data in this regression are obtained from Bank Compustat. The Bank of New England is not included in this regression. The book value of assets used to normalize the variables is that reported in third quarter of 1989. The regressions include a constant whose coefficient is not reported. 
